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Competitive dynamics research has focused on studying whether rivals are able and likely 
to carry out competitive actions, typically by examining indirect reasons such as character-
istics of the actions themselves, the firms involved, or the competitive context. We explore 
why rivals initiate a specific competitive action at a particular time and situation. Drawing 
from the philosophy of action literature, we introduce the concept of competitive rationales 
to examine the primary reasons that cause tactical actions. Given the rapid exchanges 
characterizing tactical competitive dynamics, we conducted an inductive, multicase study 
to explore the reasons behind over 800 discrete tactical decisions carried out by 9 profes-
sional basketball coaches during 15 basketball games. To garner insight, we develop a 
conceptual framework revealing their types and scope. Even during intense head-to-head 
rivalry, most rationales were not rivalrous but were instead organizational—to optimize 
resource use, strategic consistency, and reputation—or social—to manage relationships. 
Moreover, the three main types of rationales varied in scope, extending beyond immediate 
competitive situations and rivals to address longer term, strategic outcomes, and assorted 
stakeholders. Thus, our analysis reveals these rationales to be complex and potentially dif-
ficult for rivals to decipher. It also recasts each component of the dominant awareness-
motivation-capability (AMC) model of rivalry, suggesting that awareness is challenged by 
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subtle rationales, motivation drives not only action but also forbearance, and capability is 
both a requirement and product of action.
Keywords: competitive rationales; competitive intent; competitive dynamics; tactical actions; 
strategic forbearance; managerial cognition
Introduction
Competitive action is the central construct and a key distinguishing feature of competitive 
dynamics research (Chen & Miller, 2012, 2015). Defined as “a specific and detectable com-
petitive move, such as a price cut or a new product introduction initiated by a firm, to defend 
or improve its relative competitive position” (Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & Chen, 1991: 61), 
competitive actions are essential components of competitive attacks and responses (Chen & 
Miller, 1994), competitive aggressiveness (Andrevski & Ferrier, 2019; Ferrier & Lee, 2002), 
competitive complexity (Connelly, Tihanyi, Ketchen, Carnes, & Ferrier, 2017), and inertia 
(Miller & Chen, 1996).
Unfortunately, the primary reasons why managers carry out specific competitive actions 
and responses remain underexplored. Competitive dynamics research has examined vari-
ous factors that drive competitive actions: superior capabilities (e.g., Andrevski, Brass, & 
Ferrier, 2016; Carnes, Xu, Sirmon, & Karadag, 2019; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; 
Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 2011; Smith et al., 1991), market centrality and multimarket con-
tact (e.g., Chen & Miller, 1994; Livengood & Reger, 2010; McGrath, Chen, & MacMillan, 
1998; Yu & Cannella, 2013), subjective perceptions of rivalry and tension (e.g., Chen, Su, 
&Tsai, 2007; Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010), and managerial cognitive dispositions 
(e.g., Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Nadkarni & Chen, 2014). 
However, those factors are not the primary reasons for a specific action. They describe 
what enables, stimulates, and hinders the motivation to carry out any competitive action. 
For example, competitive tension or superior capability can tempt action but cannot explain 
why a firm initiates a specific action at a particular time or situation, nor what a firm is 
attempting to achieve with that action.
Drawing on the philosophy of action literature, we introduce the construct of competitive 
rationale in studying the primary reasons that directly cause a specific competitive action or 
inaction. We apply the causal theory of action to provide theoretical underpinnings of com-
petitive rationales (Davis, 2013; Davidson, 1963; O’Connor, 2013). This theory “can explain 
a person’s actions by citing the reasons for which (s)he did them” (Davis, 2013: 35). Primary 
reasons are an agent’s own reasons for performing an action. They describe what an agent 
wants to achieve and why it carries out that particular action, which is a prerequisite for 
predicting competitive behavior, a central goal of competitive dynamics research (Chen & 
Miller, 2012). In seeking these reasons or competitive rationales, we hope to reveal both their 
principal types and scope domains.
Most research has studied drivers of strategic rather than tactical actions, which, by com-
parison, require less time, expertise, and resources to develop and implement. Yet firms com-
pete predominantly via tactical actions, often by middle-management—a reality evident in 
empirical studies of competitive aggressiveness, inertia, and simplicity (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier 
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& Lee, 2002; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999; Miller & Chen, 1994, 1996) and by work 
showing how tactics can overwhelm rivals and neutralize attacks (Andrevski & Ferrier, 
2019). Because tactical behavior embodies, implements, and adapts strategy (Chen & Miller, 
2015), it tends to reflect “strategic” purpose (Van den Steen, 2018).
Our study explores competitive rationales—primary reasons—that directly cause tacti-
cal actions. It asks: What types of rationales drive tactical actions, and what is their scope 
in competitive rivalry? Given the rapid exchanges characterizing tactical competitive 
dynamics (Chen & MacMillan, 1992), we conducted an inductive, multicase study to 
examine the reasoning behind over 800 discrete tactical decisions carried out by 9 profes-
sional basketball coaches during 15 basketball games. We interviewed coaches and asked 
them to elaborate on their rationales for each considered action. The context enabled us to 
concentrate on tactical actions, as when a game is in progress, coaches have limited time 
and resources to execute. In addition, owing to its simplicity vis-à-vis business situations, 
our setting is an exacting one for discovering the strategic role of tactics. “Studying a case 
that is likely to display the lowest incidence or intensity of some feature in a population, 
we can assume that the rest of the population is above the level identified” (Gomm, 
Hammersley, & Foster, 2000: 108). Indeed, compared to most midlevel tactical business 
managers, basketball coaches have less time, resources, or opportunity to devise and exe-
cute tactics during a game. Thus, if tactical rationales are shown to be nuanced and diverse 
where tactics are executed with limited resources in seconds, they are likely to be even 
more so in business contexts (Grimm & Smith, 1997).
Our conceptual framework for competitive rationales consists of two dimensions: rationale 
type and rationale scope. First, competitive rationales are not solely rivalrous but more often 
organizational and social. In fact, rivalrous rationales—those primarily oriented to outmaneuver 
competitors—represented just one third of the total. Surprisingly, even in intense head-to-head 
tactical competition, most rationales were organizational, intended to orchestrate resources, 
learn through experience, and improve strategic coherence and execution. Other types of ratio-
nales were social, focusing on managing relationships with stakeholders. Second, the scope of 
rationales varies across three distinct domains: the immediate situation with rivals, those relating 
to longer term outcomes, and those involving stakeholders other than rivals. We found that 67% 
of rationales were intended not only to develop, preserve, and optimize resources but also to 
achieve temporally extended objectives, adjust strategy, and manage stakeholder relationships.
Our findings suggest important modifications to the dominant AMC model of competitive 
dynamics. We find that the complexity and inscrutability of rationales conceal rival inten-
tions, thereby challenging and recasting the awareness component of the AMC model. 
Understanding the type and scope of each rationale can help interpret actions. Regarding 
motivation, we find rationales to underlie the motivation not only to act but also to strategi-
cally forbear, surfacing motivations pertaining to more distal time intervals, parties other 
than current rivals, and strategies more than unitary moves. Finally, whereas previous 
research has capability driving actions, we found the opposite: Actions often aim to build 
capabilities by dynamically managing resources for future advantage. In short, tactical 
actions constitute subtle and multifaceted vehicles for achieving long-term, strategic objec-
tives, thereby broadening current understandings.
In the pages that follow, we provide a theoretical foundation of the concept of competitive 
rationales before describing our guiding research questions, methodology, conceptual 
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framework and findings, and the implications of our study for the AMC model and more 
generally. Table 1 highlights the distinctive orientation and findings of our study and com-
pares it to previous work in competitive dynamics.
Conceptual Development
Prior Work and Orientations
Scholars of competitive dynamics have long sought to provide insights into firm rivalry 
by probing “the motivations and cognitions of actors who initiate and respond to competi-
tive actions” (Chen & Miller, 2012). Most research has concentrated on conceptual models 
of how managers identify and process data about rival firms, with little information coming 
from the managers themselves. For example, early work applied a simple expectancy-
valence framework to explain how the value of a reward and the probability of its attain-
ment triggered competitive attacks and responses (Chen & Miller, 1994). Building on this 
work, some studies adopted the influential AMC model to explain behavior based on a 
firm’s awareness of a rival attack and its motivation and capability to respond (Chen, 1996). 
Table 1
Distinctive Aspects of Our Study and Principal Findings
Distinctive Aspects Typical CD Studies Our Study of Rationales
Research focus Strategic decisions Tactical decisions
Indirect reasons and goals that 
incentivize managers to act
Immediate reasons about “why” a coach 
initiates a specific action in a given time 
and situation
Research method Rationales inferred from observable 
attributes
Rationales directly accessed from coaches’ 
statements
Quantitative analysis Qualitative analysis
Deduction Induction
Principal Findings Typical CD Studies Our Study of Rationales
Reasons for action Indirect reasons that can affect any 
action
Primary reasons that directly cause a specific 
action or inaction
Types of rationales Rivalrous rationales Rivalrous, organizational, and social 
rationales
Scope of rationales A single target domain: immediate rival, 
actions, outcomes
Three target domains: immediate situation, 
long-term strategic outcomes, and other 
implicated parties beyond a direct rival
Nature of 
rationales
Simple, parsimonious indirect factors 
that stimulate strategic actions (e.g., 
attack irreversibility; firm size, market 
commonality, cognitive dispositions)
Rich, nuanced and diverse, 43 primary 
rationales (e.g., setting a trap, deceiving a 




Empirical examination of active 
behavior
Empirical examination of both active and 





Tactics are not strategic Tactics can have long-term, broader, strategic 
roles in building resource advantages and 
maintaining strategic consistency
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Critically, inferences associated with these qualities were drawn from properties of the 
actions themselves, such as complexity, irreversibility, timing, or strategic importance 
(Chen & MacMillan, 1992; MacMillan, McCaffery, & van Wijk, 1985; Smith et al., 1991).
Some studies found that managerial awareness was heightened when other firms were 
reputed market leaders or predators or when they possessed similar resources and markets 
in common (Chen, 1996; Gimeno & Woo, 1996; MacMillan et al., 1985; Smith, Grimm, & 
Gannon, 1992). It was also influenced by top team heterogeneity and information-process-
ing capacity (Hambrick et al., 1996; Marcel, Barr, & Duhaime, 2010; Nadkarni & Chen, 
2014; Smith et al., 1991). By contrast, action complexity and the use of vague language 
were argued to obscure intent, compromising awareness (Gao, Yu, & Cannella, 2016; Guo, 
Yu, & Gimeno, 2017). Interpretation was also shaped by managerial cognitive frameworks 
(Marcel et al., 2010) and temporal dispositions (Chen & Nadkarni, 2017; Nadkarni, Chen, 
& Chen, 2016).
Core contextual drivers of the motivation to engage included market centrality and iden-
tity domains (Chen & Miller, 1994; Livengood & Reger, 2010), prior interactions, tension 
between rivals, network embeddedness, resource similarity, and multimarket contact (Chen 
et al., 2007; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Kilduff et al., 2010; Young, Smith, & Grimm, 
1996; Yu & Cannella, 2013).
Finally, a frequently cited stimulus for action was superior capability. A firm was found to 
act or respond when it had superior technological resources (Ndofor et al., 2011), network 
positions and alliances (Andrevski et al., 2016; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001), information-
processing capacity (Chi, Ravichandran, & Andrevski, 2010; Smith et al., 1991), slack 
resources (Carnes et al., 2019), and scale (Chen & Hambrick, 1995).
Although this research provides important insights into the processes of attending and 
reacting to competitive information, our understanding of the reasons for managers’ competi-
tive actions remains limited. Most research has tended to infer the reasons behind actions 
indirectly from the attributes or features of managers, firms, markets, and actions. What 
remain underexplored are managers’ own rationales that explain why actions are initiated at 
a specific time and in a specific context. In this study, we introduce the concept of competi-
tive rationale and, based on our findings, develop a framework capturing and classifying key 
rationales that drive tactical actions.
The Concept of Competitive Rationale
We leverage the causal theory of action to provide a theoretical foundation for competi-
tive rationales (Davis, 2013; Davidson, 1963; O’Connor, 2013). The premise of the theory 
is that reasons underlie human behavior. The focus is on an agent’s own reasons for initiat-
ing an action rather than any external events that may stimulate an action (O’Connor, 
2013). An agent has a reason to act when that action is a result of a desire—wanting to 
achieve something and a belief—confidence that by taking a specific action one would 
attain something desired (Davidson, 1963). Of course, reasons explain actions or deliber-
ate inaction regardless of whether an agent’s belief is correct. Similarly, whether a reason 
adheres to certain conventions or norms is also not critical for it to drive an action. Thus, 
the focus of action philosophers is on primary reasons—reasons that directly cause a spe-
cific action or inaction (Davidson, 1963), regardless of whether they comply with norms 
or achieve agent goals (Davis, 2013).
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Primary reasons describe what an agent wants to accomplish with an action (intent) and 
why it carries out that particular action (explanation) (Davis, 2013). “To know the primary 
reason why someone acted as (s)he did is to know an intention with which the action was 
done” (Davidson, 1963: 689). However, the concept of primary reason is broader than inten-
tion, comprising also explanation. “In explaining an action, we come to know why the agent 
acted as (s)he did; and to know why someone does something is to know the reason for his/
her doing it” (Everson, 2013: 145).
The causal theory of action also implies the counterfactual. When action is said to occur 
because of a primary reason X, we also imply that it would not occur in the absence of X 
(Davis, 2013: 36). In other words, insufficient knowledge of the primary reasons for a spe-
cific action hobbles its interpretation. “When we ask why someone acted . . . we want to be 
provided with an interpretation. When we learn his/her reason, we have an interpretation 
. . .” (Davidson, 1963: 691). Hence, it follows that understanding such reasons is essential 
for explaining and predicting competitive behavior. We build on the causal theory of action 
to garner insight into the reasons that inform rivalry.
In this study, we focus on primary reasons that explain why an agent initiates a particular 
competitive action. For example, a coach can substitute players (an action) because they 
were not disciplined in executing a particular tactic (the primary reason). Of course, this 
action can serve other goals such as improving performance. However, the latter are not pri-
mary reasons for the substitution and have limited predictive utility—it is of little value to 
know opponents made a substitution to perform better. Primary reasons, by contrast, provide 
more actionable information. Knowing a rival’s action addresses a specific defensive failure 
can guide a coach toward a way to thwart that effort.
In short, we define competitive rationales as the primary reasons that directly explain why 
specific actions are initiated at a given moment and under specific circumstances. These 
rationales are conceptually distinct from less specific reasons explored in previous research, 
including superior capabilities, favorable market conditions, psychological states, and cogni-
tive dispositions. The latter describe general conditions, dispositions, and goals that can trig-
ger any action but do not explain why a particular action was initiated. We elaborate on these 
contrasts below.
Competitive Rationales Versus Other Reasons Studied in Competitive 
Dynamics
Superior Capabilities
As noted above, a common reason for carrying out competitive actions is said to be a 
firm’s superior internal and external resources and capabilities (e.g., Andrevski et al., 2016; 
Carnes et al., 2019; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Ndofor et al., 2011; Smith et al., 1991). 
Clearly, however, capabilities are not primary reasons for carrying out a particular action. 
They reflect a general potential to act but do not explain the specific reason why firms initiate 
a particular action at a given time and situation.
Market Conditions
Other studies have explored the role of market characteristics, such as centrality, identity 
domain, alliance network position, and multimarket contact in explaining competitive actions 
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and responses (Chen & Miller, 1994; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001; Livengood & Reger, 
2010; McGrath et al., 1998; Yu & Cannella, 2013). Market conditions can trigger multiple 
types of actions but do not differentiate between their rationales. They only define a precipi-
tating context but cannot explain just what managers want to achieve.
Subjective Perceptions of Competitors
Other reasons for acting have been inferred from psychological experiences of rivalry and 
competitive tension (Chen et al., 2007; Kilduff et al., 2010). Again, these factors can stimu-
late actions but do not explain why a particular action occurred. For example, competitive 
tension might motivate a firm to cut prices because of a cost advantage or to match a rival’s 
price cut. Alternatively, the firm might forbear from cutting prices in an effort to deescalate 
rivalry. Each of these rationales can be triggered by competitive tension. Thus, perceptions 
of rivals may tempt one to act, whereas primary reasons explain why an action occurred.
Managerial Cognition
Research on managerial cognition has examined factors that affect how executives notice 
and interpret rivals’ actions (Marcel et al., 2010). Action and top management characteristics, 
firm information processing capabilities, and managers’ cognitive frameworks affect how 
managers filter information, focus attention, and identify rivals (e.g., Hambrick et al., 1996; 
Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Nadkarni & Chen, 2014; Smith et al., 1991). Such factors help to 
explain where managers direct their attention but not why they initiate a particular action. 
Noticing an action is quite different from knowing the reasons behind it. Like perceptions, 
cognitive dispositions are personal traits that predispose managers to take actions, but they 
do not explain why managers initiate a specific action.
Why Study Competitive Rationales?
Whereas previous research examined whether a competitor is able and likely to initiate a 
competitive attack or response, our study asks why a competitor initiates a particular action 
or response and what it intends to achieve with it, thereby directly linking cause and effect. 
According to the causal theory of action, “the explanation by reasons is a type of causal 
explanation” (Davis, 2013: 35). When we know the primary reason that causes an action, we 
can understand what an agent wants to accomplish and why a competitive action is carried 
out. For example, by studying the primary reasons, we can learn whether an action is directed 
to neutralize a rival’s action or is primarily intended to address other organizational and 
social issues. We can also get a better understanding of the scope of its intended outcomes: 
Does it address the immediate situation or involve longer term objectives? Is it intended to 
deal with a current rival or primarily aimed at shaping relationships with other parties? Is it 
an integrative part of a broader strategy? Equally important, by focusing on primary reasons, 
we can distinguish competitive rationales from other reasons studied in previous competitive 
dynamics research.
Thus, in this study, we take initial steps toward developing a conceptual framework for 
studying competitive rationales. By leveraging an inductive approach, we surface key types 
and scope domains of competitive rationales that help to explain and predict tactical competi-
tive behavior.
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Method
Research Design and Setting
To gain insight into the rationales for tactical actions, we collected qualitative data from 
interviews and observations of basketball coaches. We employed a multiple-case study 
approach to analyze data from multiple decision makers on multiple occasions (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Although findings from sports settings are sometimes thought to be limited in general-
ity, they are appropriate for studying tactical decision making such as that by midlevel brand 
or sales managers. Moreover, their advantages of unambiguous observation, precise mea-
sures, motivated participants, and few confounds have for decades enlightened organiza-
tional analysis (Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005). For example, studies of 
basketball and baseball provide insight into the nature of tacit knowledge, human capital, 
organizational status, strategy, and competitive advantage (Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002; 
Poppo & Weigelt, 2000; Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt, 2008; Washington & Zajac, 2005; Wright, 
Smart, & McMahan, 1995). Sports also are a common domain for competitive dynamics 
scholars, especially those pursuing sociocognitive aspects of rivalry (Kilduff et al., 2010; 
2016; Miller, Pastoriza, & Plante, 2019; To, Kilduff, Ordonez, & Schweitzer, 2018). For 
example, Kilduff et al. (2010) demonstrate revealingly how institutionalized rivalries shape 
the intensity of basketball play and outcomes.
As with other sports-related studies, our choice of a basketball coaching setting afforded 
several advantages for studying tactical behavior. First, a game unambiguously consists of 
two head-to-head rivals competing with visible actions that require little time and resources 
to execute. Second, when games are in progress, coaches must consider both the short-term 
and long-term impact of their actions on their team’s capabilities, rivals, and stakeholders. 
Third, a member of our research team was granted proximate, complete, and unfiltered 
access to the primary reasons stated for each action or inaction during multiple games.
Basketball coaching also is a useful context for exploring tactical nuance and complexity. 
If tactical rationales are diverse, multifaceted, and potentially strategic within this temporally 
and resource-constrained context, these characteristics are apt to be even more prevalent in 
business, where managers have more time, resources, and competitive options to consider 
(see Table 2).
Preliminary Interviews
We decided on a basketball coaching setting only after conducting preliminary inter-
views with seven coaches from seven basketball clubs competing in the International 
Basketball Federation (FIBA) leagues as well as Canadian and United States college 
leagues (one of the authors was a professional player for 11 years in FIBA). Our meetings 
in June and July 2013 assessed the prevalence of tactical actions in their decision-making. 
We found that tactical forbearances—that is, deliberately deciding not to act for specific 
reasons—occurred frequently. These were captured in statements made by the coaches we 
interviewed, such as “we wanted to X . . . but we decided to hold back because.” In this 
exploratory stage, we also assessed coaches’ readiness and capacity to provide rationales. 
Their responses were encouraging, prompting us to develop a protocol to conduct post-
game interviews with coaches to capture the rationales for their tactical behavior during 
games.
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Data
The Sample
We relied on personal contacts with coaches and sports directors to contact the coaches of 
all 10 men’s teams of a European country’s first national league. Nine out of 10 coaches 
agreed to participate due to their familiarity with the first author. They were interviewed on 
more than one occasion as their teams participated in multiple games. This allowed us to col-
lect data from multiple coaches and multiple games for each coach. In total, we conducted 30 
postgame interviews with 9 head coaches about their tactical decisions in 15 basketball 
games in one European country (a member of the FIBA–Europe). We collected archival data 
for each coach and team from three sources: the statistical database of FIBA Europe, the 
basketball federation of the country in which we conducted interviews, and the videotaped 
games. Coaches, all male nationals, had diverse coaching experience (2-33 years), coaching 
success (0-6 championship titles), prior team rankings (from 2nd to 10th place in the previ-
ous season), and age (32-62 years).
We focused our data gathering on 15 regular season games taking place between October 
19, 2013 and November 11, 2013. The set of games played on October 19 represented the 
second week of the 2013 to 2014 basketball season. We used the first week of games—
played on October 12, 2013 but not included in our sample—to test our video equipment, 
check the quality of the edited videos, get feedback from the coaches about the videos and 
their availability for interviews, and inform them about the interview protocol using the 
videos.
Data Collection Procedures
The lead author conducted all interviews to reduce person-specific inconsistencies in the 
data collection process (Corley & Gioia, 2004). He was entirely familiar with basketball 
terminology and, again, had extensive professional basketball experience. Coaches were 
assured of confidentiality.
In collaboration with the basketball federation of the country, we hired a professional 
media firm to videotape each game using two camcorders: one to capture action on the 
basketball court and the other to capture information on the electronic scoreboard. The 
videos were then electronically spliced together to continuously show the game score, time 
period, and game clock time as the game was in progress. These videos were used in post-
game interviews with the coaches to facilitate a retrospective analysis of the games and 
coaches’ decisions. The lead author met with each coach within a couple of days after the 
Table 2
Basketball Competition Versus Business Competition
Basketball Competition Business Competition
Action development time Seconds to minutes Months to years
Action development resources Limited Considerable
Competitive interaction duration Periodic (quarter/game) Open-ended
Decision makers Few (head coach and two 
assistant coaches)
Several (top managers 
and middle managers)
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game—whenever the coach was available—but before his next scheduled game. Eighteen 
of the 30 interviews (60%) took place within two days of the focal game with another 5 
interviews (cumulatively 77%) within 3 days of the game. The remaining 7 interviews 
occurred within 6 days of the focal game.
The interviewer presented the following script to each coach before the interview (also 
included in the consent form):
As a basketball coach, you make many decisions during a basketball game, such as decisions to 
substitute a player, not take a timeout, change a play, or continue playing the same defensive 
formation. Thus, you are making decisions to act or not, for example, because you believe not 
changing would improve your team’s performance. I will ask you to elaborate on the reasons 
why you chose to act or not to act at that time. I ask you to comment on all decisions you made 
during the game: decisions to act and decisions to purposefully not initiate a considered action.
Thus, our focus was on exploring the rationales—the primary reasons—for considered 
tactical actions or forbearances. We conducted interviews using two laptop computers: one 
for watching the game and one for taking notes. The coach was instructed to stop the video 
at any point during the replay of game when he considered a tactical move—whether carried 
out or not—such as changes in offensive or defensive tactics, player substitutions, and time-
outs. Interviews lasted from 2 hours and 10 minutes to 2 hours and 55 minutes per game. As 
the interview progressed, the first author noted, in an Excel spreadsheet, critical facts associ-
ated with each coach-initiated stoppage of the video playback: the type of tactical move 
considered, the time and period of play displayed on the game clock, and the score of the 
game at that moment. Most importantly, for each coach-initiated video playback stoppage, 
the interviewer wrote verbatim the coach’s detailed reason for carrying out—or not—the 
tactical action considered at that precise time. Table 3 presents numerous examples of vari-
ous rationales translated from the coach’s native language.
Our study employed retrospective interviews with coaches as they watched videos of 
their own games. Thus, tactical actions and rationales may have been underreported due to 
incomplete or inaccurate coach recollections. We tried to limit such recall bias by conduct-
ing interviews soon after a game. Also, our protocol never broached issues of the success or 
appropriateness of moves.
Analysis
Our data include 841 statements from coaches transcribed during the interviews describ-
ing their reasons for acting or not acting. Two authors with limited basketball knowledge and 
not involved in the data collection process coded the data together with the expert author who 
had collected that data (samples of the raw data are shown in Table 3). During the analysis, 
the expert-author described and clarified the meaning of any “technical” terms used by the 
coaches (e.g., zone press, pick-and-roll, pick-and-pop, switching in defense, boxing out, 
etc.). Coding was conducted collectively using both the lead author’s expert interpretations 
and the other two authors’ interpretations of coaches’ statements.
In this “first-order” analysis, the three coders attempted to identify from coaches’ state-
ments all primary reasons for actions or inactions, proceeding until saturation was reached. 
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three authors (Grodal, Anteby, & Holm, 2021). The authors generated labels for the rationales 
they believed were embodied in the coach statements, keeping the labels as close as possible 
to the coaches’ terminology—for example, to surprise a rival, to preempt a rival, to enhance 
player learning, to increase player confidence, or to improve strategy execution (Gioia, Corley, 
& Hamilton, 2013). Saturation level was reached after 300 analyzed statements, which cov-
ered the first five games. In fact, after the first 250 statements hardly any new rationales 
emerged. This analysis yielded 34 primary rationales for tactical actions and 24 for tactical 
forbearances (with some actions and forbearances having rationale types in common, yielding 
43 rationales in total). Table 3 illustrates the hierarchical structure of our data, including trans-
lated representative coaches’ statements for each of the 43 primary rationales.
In a second step, we searched for similarities across primary rationales and attempted to 
group them into more general, second-order categories (Grodal et al., 2021). To accomplish 
this reliably, two authors independently analyzed similarities among primary rationales and 
attempted to group them into more general categories (e.g., to learn, to adjust strategy, to 
orchestrate resources, to deceive rivals, to manage interpersonal relationships). Next, the 
three authors met to reconcile the categories, reaching agreement on 12 of them (in 3 cases 
where there was disagreement among the raters, separate categories were preserved). The 
expert author then went back to code all 841 statements. To establish coding reliability, 
another author blindly coded a random sample of a different set of 42 statements (5% of the 
data). The resulting Perreault and Leigh’s (1989) reliability index was 0.74 for second-order 
categories, above the prescribed 0.70 cutoff.1
In revisiting statements within our primary rationales and their second-order categories, 
and through more discussion among the authors, we identified three overarching third-order 
rationale types. These are rivalrous, organizational, and social rationales. Rivalrous ratio-
nales prioritized a current and specific rival and its actions. Organizational rationales were 
primarily directed toward making organizational adjustments such as preserving resources, 
fixing execution failures, or maintaining strategic consistency. Finally, social rationales pri-
oritized clearly relational and interpersonal issues—for example, to motivate, avoid embar-
rassment, or preserve rival dignity.
Within each of the three rationale types—rivalrous, organizational, and social—the three 
authors as a group revisited the primary rationales to discover the scope of their target 
domains, the second dimension of our framework (Tavory & Timmermans, 2014). Rationales 
were found to vary according to temporal and strategic scope and the range of external par-
ties considered beyond the current rival. This process identified three target domains—the 
immediate situation, longer term strategic outcomes, and other external parties. Together, 
the three rationale types, each reflecting three potential target domains, constitute the struc-
ture of our findings (9 cells, see Table 4). We classified the primary rationales accordingly. 
The authors reached consensus on most of the rationales identified by a unique cell in Table 
4 (I to IX). In eight cases, the primary rationales were allocated to two cells.2
Findings
Types of Competitive Rationales
Whereas all tactical actions are competitive—that is, intended to improve performance 
vis-à-vis rivals—their primary reasons can be rivalrous, organizational, and/or social. 
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Rivalrous rationales are reasons with a primary purpose, for example, to outwit competitors, 
disrupt rival rhythm, mislead current and future rivals, or neutralize rival strategy. 
Organizational rationales are reasons related to organizational adjustments. Although these 
rationales can ultimately affect performance and thus rivals, their primary intent is to address 
the organization itself, not rivals or their actions. Finally, social rationales deal primarily 
with relational and interpersonal issues. They address norms and expectations of various 
stakeholders and manage team dynamics.
Even in a highly competitive zero-sum situation, 74% of all rationales mentioned by 
coaches sought to improve the general capacity to compete through improved organization. 
For example, they substituted players not to attack or respond to an opponent but primarily 
for organizational reasons such as nurturing resources and ensuring strategic coherence. 
Table 4









To preempt a rival To boost energy To increase team 
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To neutralize a rival’s 
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To calm fans
To influence referees
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Three hundred and fifty (42%) rationales related to adjusting strategy, 213 (25%) to organi-
zational learning and orchestrating resources, and 58 (7%) to dealing with strategic limita-
tions. Social rationales surfaced here, too, in maintaining morale and confidence and 
protecting the dignity of opponents and others. Twenty-three nonrivalrous rationales were 
initiated for social reasons (3%), while the rest were rivalrous (23%).
Competition in business, too, is not simply a matter of responding to rivals or attacking 
them. Firms must build organizationally and socially while in the heat of competition in 
order to become more effective. For a responder to erroneously assume that an action is 
backed by rivalrous intent can lead to retaliatory responses that unnecessarily escalate 
rivalry.
Scope of Competitive Rationales
Our second dimension considers how rivalrous, organizational, and social rationales dif-
fer in scope across the three target domains of immediate situation, long-term strategic out-
comes, and other external parties. As noted, Table 4 juxtaposes the three rationale types and 
three target domains of rationales. Each cell in the table embeds the primary rationales that 
most closely correspond to each rationale type and target domain.
The first target domain—the immediate situation—describes rationales primarily con-
cerned with a direct rival, action, and its immediate effects (within the same quarter of the 
game or a single exchange). Typically, these rationales aim to neutralize a rival’s specific 
action, exploit sudden opportunities to score, and prevent execution failures. The second 
domain comprises rationales with a longer term and strategic orientation. They seek benefits 
over multiple exchanges and periods of the game and possibly even beyond a current game; 
they mainly focus on achieving broader, strategic purposes such as disrupting rival strategy, 
testing and modifying one’ own strategy, and protecting reputation. The third domain cap-
tures rationales that deal with a team’s external parties other than a direct rival, which include 
future rivals, fans, and referees.3
The types and scope of rationales are common for both actions and forbearances. Coaches 
often used forbearance for rivalrous, organizational, and social reasons—they were espe-
cially instrumental for achieving longer term and systemic/strategic goals. We identified 673 
rationales for action (80%) and 168 for forbearance (20%) (see Table 5).
Competitive Rationales Framework
Rivalrous Rationales
As noted, rivalrous rationales are directed toward acting or responding directly to oppo-
nents. Their target domain may be the immediate rival and outcomes, longer term strategic 
moves directed to rivals, and other external parties in the competitive exchange.
Immediate situation. Given the traditional focus of the competitive dynamics literature, it 
was not surprising that many actions were rivalrous; that is, intended to outmaneuver oppo-
nents at a given moment in time. The first set of rivalrous rationales (Cell I in Table 4) deals 
with direct rivals and immediate action outcomes. Some of these rationales have to do with 
surprising, confusing, and deceiving an opponent. Coaches deployed tactics to throw rivals 
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Table 5
Competitive Rationales by Actions and Forbearances
Rationale Categories Action Forbearance Total Percentage
Organizational 477 144 621 74
 To adjust strategy 312 38 350  
 To learn 52 55 107  
 To orchestrate resources 87 19 106  
 To overcome strategic limitations 26 32 58  
Rivalrous 183 14 197 23
 To attack a rival’s weakness 64 64  
 To deceive rivals 8 5 13  
 To disrupt rival momentum 35 1 36  
 To neutralize a rival’s advantage 49 3 52  
 To preempt a rival 11 3 14  
 To surprise 16 2 18  
Social 13 10 23 3
 To manage relationships with other parties 7 5 12  
 To manage team dynamics 6 5 11  











UpCoach ID Action Forbearance Total
Coach 1 81 35 116 30 62 33 6 5
 Game 1 25 17 42 40  
 Game 5 26 9 35 26  
 Game 11 30 9 39 23  
Coach 2 62 12 74 16 40 4 1 1
 Game 1 21 8 29 28  
 Game 6 18 2 20 10  
 Game 9 23 2 25 8  
Coach 3 51 2 53 4 44 3 0 1
 Game 2 15 1 16 6  
 Game 8 16 16 0  
 Game 15 20 1 21 5  
Coach 4 105 18 123 15 40 4 0 0
 Game 2 27 5 32 16  
 Game 7 24 4 28 14  
 Game 11 27 4 31 13  
 Game 14 27 5 32 16  
Coach 5 80 14 94 15 47 16 1 3
 Game 3 19 4 23 17  
 Game 6 17 3 20 15  
 Game 10 18 1 19 5  
 Game 14 26 6 32 19  
Coach 6 68 19 87 22 44 4 0 1
 Game 3 17 8 25 32  
(continued)
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off their game, specifically, to disrupt their rhythm (Table 3—AR30), set a trap (AR22), 
surprise them (A24; F24), or mislead them (AR21; FR21).4 For example, a coach attempted 
to negate rival momentum by telling players “to make quick non-shooting fouls” (Coach 2, 
Game 1 (C2, G1) in our data). Another coach took a timeout to disrupt his rival’s rhythm: 
They scored several unanswered points. I took a timeout to stop their run (C5; G3). Coaches 
also initiated actions to set a trap for the opponent: We started fouling [in the last two minutes 
of the fourth quarter] to get faster in bonus, so we can stop the game by giving the opponent 
free throws. This way we can get more possessions before the end of the game (AR22). One 
coach unexpectedly changed his defense after a timeout to surprise the opponent: I changed 
to zone defense after a timeout; I wanted to surprise them (C8; G4). Another coach attempted 
to surprise more regularly: We alternate every other possession between zone and man-to-
man defense to confuse them and stay unpredictable (C6; G9).
Coaches also attempted to deceive opponents: There were 2 seconds left. I called Player 
X to come talk to me. I told him to stay and pretend as if he is talking to me. Then, I told him 
to suddenly sprint and try to score by surprise (C9, G12); they also intended to mislead with 
forbearance: I faked playing zone defense. Our players made a zone defense formation, but 
after their first pass, we actually played man-to-man defense (AR21). A coach even 
attempted to avoid strictly following the rules: I am keeping my players 30 seconds more on 
timeouts despite referees’ warnings. I play with only 6 quality players and they needed rest 
(AR23). Other rationales were more typical of prior work in competitive dynamics. For 
example, coaches initiated actions and forbearances to preempt rivals (AR20; FR20) and to 
neutralize their actions (AR26) and advantages (AR29; FR29) (e.g., Chen & Miller, 2012; 
Ma, 1999; Porter, 2008).
In summary, this set of rivalrous rationales primarily deals with the current and immediate 











UpCoach ID Action Forbearance Total
 Game 9 22 8 30 27  
 Game 13 29 3 32 9  
Coach 7 102 28 130 22 32 2 0 0
 Game 4 26 16 42 38  
 Game 7 26 7 33 21  
 Game 12 30 2 32 6  
 Game 15 20 3 23 13  
Coach 8 83 16 99 16 44 5 0 1
 Game 4 23 9 32 28  
 Game 5 20 2 22 9  
 Game 10 24 4 28 14  
 Game 13 16 1 17 6  
Coach 9 41 24 65 37 36 6 4 2
 Game 8 19 21 40 53  
 Game 12 22 3 25 12  
Grand total 673 168 841 20  
Table 5 (continued)
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Longer term strategic outcomes. Other rivalrous rationales focused on achieving ben-
efits beyond the immediate situation and beyond single moves to achieve longer term 
strategic goals (Cell II, Table 4). For example, we identified forbearances that were initi-
ated to achieve longer term benefits, such as preserving moves to use as surprises later 
in the game: I anticipated that the opponent would instruct his team how to attack 2-3 
zone during the time out, so my intent was to surprise him with 1-3-1 zone defense. So 
I postponed this action to the second half (C1; G5; FR24). Another coach identified a 
problem but decided not to address it with a contemplated action: I feel that our man to 
man defense is weak. I am thinking now of trying a new type of defense (i.e., matchup 
zone), but I decided not to because I wanted to keep this defense as a surprise later (C1; 
G1). The rationales for these forbearances go beyond creating short-term advantages to 
achieve a stronger position in the future.
Other competitive actions were initiated to influence a rival’s overall strategy rather than 
address any particular move. For example, a coach initiated a move to interrupt a rival’s 
strategy: I changed again to zone 2-3 (from 1-3-1); I just wanted to interrupt their offensive 
game; I did not want them to adjust to 1-3-1 zone (C1; G5). A coach also attempted to neu-
tralize an opponent’s defensive strategy: They were playing zone defense; I quickly reacted 
telling our team to change our offense (C4; G2).
Other external parties. Rivalrous rationales concern not only current rivals but also other 
parties involved in a current or future competitive context (Cell III, Table 4). For example, 
some coaches used forbearances to conceal their intentions from future rivals: I decided not 
to fix (a defensive error) because we were losing this game anyways. We will fix the issue in 
practice. I want to trick our next opponents into believing they can easily attack our defense 
(FR21). One coach intentionally argued with the referees to increase competitive tension and 
create psychological advantage over an opponent: I got into an argument with the referees 
and risked getting a technical foul to create tension (AR32).
Collectively, the above statements make clear that although rivalrous rationales were pri-
marily intended to outmaneuver current rivals, they differ in short-term versus longer term 
objectives, specific moves versus systemic strategic ones, and a focus on direct rivals versus 
other parties. This signals a range, complexity, and subtlety in rivalrous rationales hitherto 
unanticipated in the literature.
Business relevance. Our exploration of rivalrous rationales has surfaced neglected issues 
that challenge managers’ ability to interpret the competitive landscape. These include pur-
poseful deception and forbearance, systemic and strategic timing of moves, considerations 
regarding future competitive engagements, and dealing with multiple stakeholders beyond a 
single rival. Clearly, in business situations where timing, disruption, and surprise are of the 
essence, these factors are likely to figure prominently.
Organizational Rationales
Organizational rationales are directed primarily towards improving team resources, strat-
egy, and execution. As with rivalrous rationales, their target domains may be the immediate 
competitive situation, longer term strategy-related organizational moves rather than singular 
moves, and other parties.
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Immediate situation. The first set of organizational rationales were primarily con-
cerned with quickly fixing internal failures in execution, intensifying effort, and exploiting 
resources (Cell IV, Table 4). For example, some coaches addressed immediate issues with 
execution: I took a timeout because of a bad pass. Our transition defense was also bad, we 
needed to fix this (C3; G2). I replaced [Player X]; he did not do a good job in defense (C7; 
G4). I took a timeout; we must move the ball faster. . . (C2; G1). Some actions were initi-
ated to bring new energy: I put [Player X] in. I wanted to refresh my team, to bring more 
energy (C1; G5). I started playing full court pressing to try to reduce their lead (C4; G2). 
I put [Player X] in to enhance our offense; he is a very athletic player who can also help 
us with rebounding in defense (C5; G3). Other actions were intended to exploit a superior 
resource: I started playing ‘pick & pop.’. . .Our centers are great shooters and we can 
exploit this advantage now (AR12).
Longer term strategic outcomes. Other organizational rationales were concerned with 
longer term outcomes (Cell V, Table 4). For example, some actions were initiated primarily 
to learn through experience: I put [Player X] back in the game. I wanted to give him a chance 
to play more, so I will know whether I can count on him for other games and which of his 
qualities can help my team (C1; G1). Another coach chose to forbear for similar reasons: I am 
thinking of taking a timeout but I will wait because I want my players to struggle and learn 
how to deal with adversity (C1; G1). This experiential process was initiated to gain longer 
term benefits, sometimes even beyond the current contest.
Forbearances, quite common in this category, were also employed when coaches wanted 
to reduce uncertainty by using a wait-and-see approach: I thought about making a sub but 
waited a little bit because the score was favorable (C2; G1). We committed two errors; I am 
thinking of taking a timeout to prevent further score decline. But I will wait two more attacks 
(C8; G4). At other times, forbearances were intended to preserve options: I needed to call a 
timeout, but I decided to keep it for my last two attacks, to organize them, so we can finish 
successfully (C7; G4).
Furthermore, coaches regularly initiated actions with a primary purpose to optimize 
resources (AR11): I took [Player X] out, [Player Y] in. I just wanted to keep both players in 
rotation (C6; G3). Other coaches stated: I replaced [Player X] and [Player Y]. I wanted to 
rest players and put fresh players in (C6; G9). Coaches also acted to preserve players for 
more opportune moments: I replaced Player X . . . he was in foul trouble and I wanted to 
save him for the 4th quarter (C6; G13). Forbearances were also intended to preserve resources 
(FR10; FR2): I thought of putting [Player X] to improve rebounding. However, I would risk 
getting him in foul trouble because he would need to guard a smaller and faster player. So, I 
restrained from this action (C9; G8). Another coach preserved an option to use a timeout at 
a later time: I decided not to take a timeout to preserve it for later [when our team needs to 
rest] (C4; G2).
Some actions were initiated to change strategy (AR9), We change our defense from 
“hedging” to “switching” pick & roll (C7; G7), and make strategic adjustments (AR8), I 
took a timeout. Our offense was stagnant and I wanted to speed up the game (C5; G10). 
Other coaches said they avoided taking actions that could slow execution: I noticed their big 
guy is in foul trouble, so I thought we might exploit that advantage. However, our strategy 
worked well, we moved the ball well, and this move might slow the ball movement [killing 
our momentum]. I decided to not change anything (FR7). They also prevented clashes with 
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strategy: I recognized an opportunity to exploit a mismatch. . . . However, I decided to not 
do that because I did not want my players to get out of our system [of play] . . . to start 
playing individually (C7; G4).
Finally, actions were carried out to test strategy: I put in zone defense for two possessions 
to see if it works and whether I can use it later. The score was comfortable, so I can test 
whether zone could be effective (AR5). Similarly, one coach tried out a new defense in a 
game situation: I changed into zone defense; we just want to try how it will work; there is not 
much time left in the game to hurt us, but we can learn from it (C6; G3).
Other external parties. Beyond the current game, coaches initiated actions and for-
bearances to improve their team’s capabilities for competing against future rivals (Cell 
VI, Table 4). For example, a coach made substitution to test whether a player can be 
effective with the next opponents: I put [Player X] back in the game. I wanted to give 
him a chance to play more, so I will know whether I can count on him for the next games 
and which of his qualities can help my team (C1; G1). Another coach used forbearance 
to integrate new players in the team: Player X and Y are new additions to our team . . . 
not familiar with our defensive schemes . . . not synchronized with the other players. I 
thought of substitution, but I give them opportunity to learn how to play with the other 
players. Our chances of winning this game are very low . . . I am thinking about the next 
opponent (C1; G1).
Collectively, organizational rationales varied in their orientation to orchestrate resources, 
create learning opportunities, or make strategic adjustments. In the short run, some rationales 
addressed execution failures and increasing team intensity. In the long run, other rationales 
focused on real-time learning, preserving options, and optimizing resources. Not surpris-
ingly, rationales for crafting strategy had a longer term orientation. Additionally, there were 
several rationales related to organizational limitations such as forced substitutions of players 
due to lack of time (FR17), injuries (AR13), or inadequate skills (FR14, FR15, FR16). We do 
not include those in Table 4 because they indicate involuntary decisions rather than purpose-
ful actions or forbearances.
Business relevance. Competitive advantage is achieved, in part, through a firm’s ability 
to develop, nurture, and leverage superior resources. Conventional wisdom holds that man-
agers develop resources primarily through strategic investments. Organizational rationales, 
by contrast, highlight the role of tactical competitive moves in enhancing current and longer 
term organizational capabilities. Indeed, rationales involving pacing and resource manage-
ment, enduring consequences of engagement, parties beyond an immediate competitor, and 
the subtle orchestration of moves are likely to be critical in today’s complex, dynamic busi-
ness context.
Social Rationales
Social rationales are directed toward improving interpersonal relationships with internal 
(e.g., players) and external parties (e.g., rivals, fans) to enhance competitive effectiveness. 
Again, its target domain may be the immediate competitive situation, longer term strategic 
outcomes, and external parties.
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Immediate situation. Some rationales were aimed at quickly dealing with players’ appro-
priate or inappropriate behavior (Cell VII, Table 4). For example, one coach attempted to 
improve the immediate competitive position by increasing player discipline: I tried to settle 
down my team; regardless of the score, we must play in a disciplined manner (C2; G9). 
Another coach dealt directly with players’ performance by sanctioning them: I took Player 
X out [because] he did not follow instructions (C1; G11). I did not want [Player Y] to be in 
the game at all; I was very mad at him! (C4; G14). Social rationales also dealt with increas-
ing team composure or coordination: We missed “bunny” [an easy shot]. I took a timeout to 
settle down my team and better control the score at the end of the game (AR38).
Longer term strategic outcomes. Cell VIII in Table 4 illustrates rationales primarily 
intended to motivate players, increase their confidence, and preserve team dignity that could 
improve team performance beyond a current game and immediate action (AR35, 36, 40; 
FR35, 36, 40). For example, a coach stated: Player X needs rest, whereas Player Y is an 
older player, I want [Y] to feel involved in the game (C6, G3); the same coach made another 
substitution: I am putting [Player X] in. He needs to play more to regain his confidence 
(C6; G3). Other coaches used sanctions to set an example and as a socialization tool: I took 
[Player X] out for a mistake in defense. I wanted [my team] to know that there will be no 
tolerance for such mistakes (C7; G4). Another coach chose forbearance for a similar reason: 
[Player X] was unhappy with my decision to replace him earlier. At this time, I was thinking 
of putting him back, but because of his reaction earlier, I decided to not play him anymore 
(C6; G13). Finally, coaches’ rationales considered other strategic outcomes such as preserv-
ing team reputation: I put [Player X] back in the game. . . . The game was already decided, 
but I wanted to cut the lead to not lose too much [in the eyes of fans] (AR41).
Other external parties. Coaches also actively managed other parties (Cell IX, Table 4). 
For example, one coach acted to calm fans (AR43), I talked to fans to calm them down a bit 
(C9, G8), and influence referees (AR42), Several times I argued with referees about calling 
a ‘moving screen’ (C4, G2). Another coach took action to protect rival dignity and maintain 
a positive relationship: I put a young [inexperienced] player because we were up 35 points, 
so they (the opponent) could reduce our lead. I did not want to be perceived by my opponent 
as disrespectful (C6; G3).
Collectively, social rationales focused mostly on managing interpersonal relationships 
and team dynamics. In the short run, coaches acted to enhance team composure and sanc-
tion behavior, managing morale and team socialization. In the long run, they were more 
focused on motivating players and dealing with high-level strategic issues related to pre-
serving team and rival reputation. They also managed other parties such as future rivals, 
fans, and referees.
Business relevance. Beyond the challenges associated with head-to-head rivalry, manag-
ers in business also need to be responsive to a wide range of stakeholders, such as suppliers, 
regulatory bodies, labor unions, environmental and social advocacy organizations, and the 
communities in which the firm operates. Our findings on social rationales suggest that man-
agers carry out some tactical actions to address the complex motivations and emotions of 
salient social actors even in situations with high levels of competitive pressure. These social 
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rationales therefore carry potential relevance to both the study and practice of competitive 
dynamics.
Implications
The theory of causal action (Davis, 2013; Davidson, 1963; O’Connor, 2013) represents a 
useful foundation for assessing the human deliberations underlying competitive behavior to 
get at its underlying causes—that is, the primary reasons for why an action does or does not 
take place. It extends competitive dynamics beyond external cues from markets and firms to 
explain competitive behavior, deepening our understanding of how competitors behave and 
why they act or forbear in specific situations.
We find that competitive behavior involves an astonishing variety of primary reasons for 
the same types of tactical actions. Specifically, our basketball coaches considered four 
observable types of competitive actions: player substitution, timeout, defense change, and 
offense change. By contrast, as noted, we identified 43 primary rationales, many of which 
could drive a single type of action. For example, Table 3 shows the many rationales motivat-
ing player substitution.5 In addition, rationales were often intended to mislead, surprise, or 
forbear, rendering them potentially inscrutable. Furthermore, coaches differed greatly in their 
rationale repertoires—posing further challenges to interpretation. Coach rationales per game 
ranged from 16 to 42 (see Table 5).6 Such complexity and inscrutability poses serious chal-
lenges for interpreting rival behavior.
Our conceptual framework takes initial steps toward developing a theory for interpreting 
competitive actions. It reveals the key types and target domains of primary rationales. The 
three types of primary reasons—rivalrous, organizational, and social—indicate what manag-
ers prioritize with a particular action; that is, dealing with rivals’ actions, making organiza-
tional adjustments, or managing interpersonal issues. That specifies the reasons for an action. 
The framework also sheds light on the target domains or scope of each rationale: immediate 
issues versus long-term objectives, a single action versus strategy, and a direct opponent 
versus other stakeholder. Thus, our findings extend competitive dynamics research by getting 
behind “observable indicators to discover the perceptions and motivations that give rise to 
observable market actions” (Chen & Miller, 2012), in the process provoking a reevaluation 
of the AMC framework.
Implications for the AMC Model
The AMC model has served as a central pillar for studying competitive action and response 
(e.g., Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007; Chen & Miller, 1994, 2012; Tsai, Su, & Chen, 2011). 
Our findings have implications for each of the model’s three components: awareness, moti-
vation, and capability. First, our research suggests that the study of rationales can expand and 
deepen our characterization of competitor awareness, revealing hitherto unrecognized chal-
lenges to interpreting rival actions. Second, primary rationales explain motivations to act or 
forbear, reflecting longer term aims, parties beyond rivals, and broader strategic goals. Third, 
whereas prior research emphasized how capabilities drive competitive actions, we also find 
the reverse—that tactical actions build capabilities—for example by preserving and orches-
trating resources to gain advantage in future periods. We discuss these findings below.
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Awareness
Prior research has focused on factors influencing how managers identify, monitor, and 
perceive rivals and how they come to be aware of their actions (Chen & Miller, 2012). 
However, one can be aware of rivals and their actions, while not comprehending their ratio-
nales. Thus, understanding competitive rationales is essential for full awareness. Without it, 
actions remain opaque to interpretation. This can be challenging as our findings have shown 
that rationales are collectively complex and potentially inscrutable.
First, they differ across our types and target domains. They can be not only rivalrous but 
organizational and social, involving internal, relational, and strategic purposes difficult to 
detect or understand. They may address situations beyond a current attack, opponent, or 
short-term outcome to pursue undetectable purposes, such as preserving options, managing 
relationships with other parties, and concealing strategies. The resulting inscrutability is 
especially challenging as many rationales are purposely obscure, deceptive, and surprising 
(Guidice, Alder, & Phelan, 2009; Hendricks & McAfee, 2006). A second challenge to aware-
ness is that rationale diversity—the range of rationale types—is far richer and broader than 
action diversity because multiple rationales can drive a single action.
Research on action-response dyads finds that awareness is influenced by an action’s 
observable characteristics—radicality, irreversibility, implementation requirements, and 
noteworthiness—all of which determine the likelihood and speed of response (Chen, Smith, 
& Grimm, 1992; Smith, Grimm, Chen, & Gannon, 1989). Our study recasts that externally 
imputed portrait of awareness, the limits of which surface when complex and inscrutable 
rationales hobble effective response. Similar limitations also apply to research on competi-
tive repertoires, sets of competitive actions carried out by firms over a given period (Connelly 
et al., 2017; Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller & Chen, 1994). Simple repertoires with few types of 
actions are said to hurt performance (Miller & Chen, 1996). However, we find that identical 
actions can be motivated by many different rationales, making even simple repertoires poten-
tially inscrutable and effective.
These findings enrich our appreciation of the potential subtlety, complexity, and chal-
lenges of competitive engagement in business. Indeed, if tactical rationales are so diverse, 
deceptive, temporarily nuanced, and broadly contextualized in basketball, that may also hold 
in business situations. There, managers with different priorities from different departments 
make decisions in a context of multiple rivals and stakeholders on a range of rival-directed, 
organizational, and social issues. Under such conditions, interpreting and explaining rivals’ 
rationales could be far more challenging than merely noticing their actions. Thus, our study 
suggests other aspects of awareness for scholars to consider in the AMC model: (1) To what 
extent can competitors distinguish rivalrous from social and organizational rationales? (2) 
How can managers assess rationale scope: for example, immediate situation versus longer 
term strategic goals and external parties? (3) How can managers recognize deceptive and 
misleading rationales?
Motivation
Competitive rationales disclose a multitude of motivations to act and respond or forbear. 
In prior studies, the motivation component of AMC concerned economic incentives and psy-
chological motivations to act or respond in a competitive situation (e.g., Kilduff et al., 2010; 
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Kilduff, Galinsky, Gallo, & Reade, 2016; Livengood & Reger, 2010; To et al., 2018; Tsai 
et al., 2011; Withers, Ireland, Miller, Harrison, & Boss, 2018). However, coach rationales 
divulge social and organizational motivating reasons for both action and inaction (Alvarez, 
2010; Davidson, 1963; O’Connor, 2013). Our discussion of awareness illustrated the inscru-
tability of such motivations.
This challenge is compounded as forbearance reflected a critical and largely invisible 
and temporally conditioned effect of motivation. Forbearance occurs when managers are 
aware of an action and capable of responding, but for strategic purposes are motivated to 
not respond immediately (Andrevski & Miller, 2020). Table 5 shows that 112 (67%) of 
forbearance rationales were long-term and strategic (to adjust strategy, to orchestrate 
resources, and to learn). In our study, coaches chose forbearance to create later advantage 
over rivals, such as to surprise and mislead them in the future, preserve an option for more 
opportune use, take time to learn from experience, or grow capability. Forbearances also 
pursued longer term strategic organizational benefits, such as preserving strategic consis-
tency or concealing a new strategy from future rivals. Thus, “managers will often strategi-
cally forbear when they look at the broader context of an attack, considering it in the light 
of parties other than the attacker, longer-term past and future events, and more systemic 
aspects of strategic cohesiveness and adaptation” (Andrevski & Miller, 2020: 10). It is 
important, therefore, that future scholars using the AMC model consider forbearance as a 
core aspect of motivation.
Interestingly, Table 5 suggests that more successful coaches chose forbearance more fre-
quently. For example, forbearances accounted for 30% of all rationales for Coach 1, who had 
won six championships (and five second places), and 37% for Coach 9, who won four cham-
pionships (and two second places). For comparison, all other coaches combined had only 
won two titles and their forbearance use averaged 17%.7
It may be that more accomplished competitors see the strategic value of forbearing, per-
haps because they contemplate longer time horizons, broader contexts, and parties beyond 
the direct rival. It is possible too that accomplished competitors are more confident and better 
able to refrain from acting impulsively under pressure. Such discipline and composure mani-
fested in forbearance may be critical to effective timing, resource orchestration, and misdi-
rection (Andrevski & Miller, 2020; Chen & Miller, 2015).
Firms engaging in multimarket competition are especially likely to forbear strategically to 
achieve economic benefits (Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Yu & Cannella, 2013). Perhaps, as sug-
gested above, such mindful engagement is especially likely to extend time horizons and the 
number of considered stakeholders and broaden strategic contexts; such careful reflection 
may yield superior returns. Multimarket competition research considers fear of retaliation 
across multiple markets as the primary reason for mutual forbearance. Our study suggests 
that multimarket rivals also might forbear to build resources for future attacks, optimize 
resource use, avoid conflicts with other stakeholders, or mislead rivals. We invite future 
researchers to assess these notions.
Capability
The capability to act and respond is also qualified by our findings. First, as noted, igno-
rance of primary rationales can thwart effective response, thus perhaps ultimately degrading 
the relevance of the stock of capabilities. Second, whereas the focus of prior studies has been 
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on a rival’s current stock of capital and knowledge resources (Chen, 1996; Connelly et al., 
2017; Miller et al., 2019), our coaches paid more attention to dynamically managing their 
own team’s capabilities rather than assessing those of rivals. Indeed, tactical actions often 
were intended to nurture, organize, and develop resources even in the throes of an intense 
competition. Thus, whereas AMC treats rivals’ relative capabilities in a largely static manner, 
our findings suggest that capability can be a very dynamic aspect of rivalry that builds over 
time and considers interactions with multiple rivals both in the moment and in the future. 
Interestingly, whereas prior research focuses on capability to carry out actions, we find a 
reverse sequence; actions are initiated to develop capabilities. This finding enriches competi-
tive dynamics research that has not “adequately embraced time-based actions that focus on 
building future competitiveness” (Chen, Michel, & Lin, 2021: 15). Thus, tactics targeting 
longer term capabilities may play a subtle strategic role in competition.
In short, our research into rationales reveals a set of new opportunities for building and 
extending the AMC model in terms of neglected challenges to awareness, strategic aspects of 
motivation, and a more dynamic consideration of capabilities.
Other Opportunities for Future Research
Competitive dynamics scholars often view competitive behavior from a rational, game theo-
retic perspective (Chen & MacMillan, 1992). However, as we have shown, the human element 
appears to be critical (see Kilduff, 2019; Kilduff et al., 2010). Our coaches attended to player 
morale and interaction, rival emotions, and the dignity of players and rivals. In inter-firm com-
petition where reputation and firm image may matter greatly, similar considerations warrant 
further examination. Our coaches also considered multiple stakeholders of competitive engage-
ment beyond direct rivals. In business, these would include customers, suppliers, and the pub-
lic. Their roles in tactical competition remain to be explored (Chen & Miller, 2015).
Action sequences constitute an uninterrupted series of competitive actions (Ferrier, 2001; 
Rindova, Ferrier, & Wiltbank, 2010). Owing to rationale inscrutability, what rivals observe 
as a predictable sequence could instead be driven by diverse and unpredictable rationales. 
Moreover, coaches were careful to use the right players at the right times, to accelerate and 
slow down the pace of play as opportunities and threats evolved, and to attack and retreat 
when the time was right. This sequencing, pacing, or timing of behavior has been accorded 
less attention in the literature on competitive dynamics, and yet it is certain to figure very 
prominently in the behavior of businesses and the managers and entrepreneurs who run them.
In competitive dynamics, the role of deception appears to be a critical one and well 
worth further exploration (Sharapov & MacAulay, 2020). Coaches initiated “fake” moves 
to confuse opponents or refrained from carrying out expected moves to conceal informa-
tion or intent, set a trap, and surprise rivals. Indeed, previous work has examined the ethi-
cal and moral aspects of competitive bluffing (Guidice, Alder, & Phelan, 2009),  while 
microeconomists have studied the role of offensive feints in patenting decisions to mislead 
rivals (Hendricks & McAfee, 2006; Langinier, 2005). Our study extends this domain by 
revealing a wide range of misleading actions and forbearances that can make competitive 
repertoires inscrutable to rivals. Further work in this domain may provide unique insights 
into the antecedents and consequences of providing intentionally misleading or incomplete 
information about competitive rationales (McGrath et al., 1998; Sharapov & MacAulay, 
2020).
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Limitations
Certainly, our study has limitations. Its context is specific: There is only one decision-
maker, the coach, and decisions take place in rapid sequence during a zero-sum game with 
clear rules. This is quite different from businesses where there are often multiple decision 
makers, with managers lower in the hierarchy making many tactical decisions, likely with 
fewer rules or temporal constraints than in basketball. In addition, although our coaches’ 
rationales did sometimes consider the morale of an opposing team, it is unclear how much 
such contemplation figures in competition among firms. Finally, the games we studied took 
place early in the season. It is uncertain whether the longer term strategic orientation of tacti-
cal rationales would change later on as championships became closer.
Moreover, we selected a competitive context in which rivals rely exclusively on tactical 
actions. Although this enabled us to reveal strategic rationales for tactical actions, it limited 
our ability to examine links between tactics and other major strategic actions. Also, basket-
ball coaches make quick decisions with limited action possibilities and timeframes, whereas 
business managers often have time to analyze data, generate alternatives, and execute actions. 
The less hectic pace may allow managers to be more strategic. Thus, as noted, we might 
expect an even richer set of rationales for tactical actions in a business context. Finally, it 
would have been nice to compare coaches and their repertoires for effectiveness, but this was 
limited by our small sample.
Conclusion
The field of competitive dynamics has been criticized as being undertheorized with too 
much emphasis on simple rational models and too little direct evidence of the complex 
human motivations underlying actual competition (Andrevski & Miller, 2020; Chen & 
Miller, 2012, 2015; Kilduff et al., 2010). Our investigation of tactical rationales reveals 
vibrant and multifaceted competitive rationales underlying observable rivalry. These ratio-
nales often reflect farsighted and subtle maneuvers, stratagems, and ploys driving tactical 
behavior. Clearly, studying observable tactics alone would reveal too little about the com-
plex, sometimes ingenious, thinking behind them.
Our study broadens the foundations of competitive dynamics research, revealing that a 
single tactical action may be driven by a wide variety of competitive, organizational, and 
social rationales, many extending beyond a current exchange in time and parties implicated, 
and encompassing systemic and strategic considerations. Rationales revealed behavior that 
was purposefully deceptive, concealed, and deliberately withheld to surprise or mislead. 
Finally, rationale complexity and inscrutability could vary substantially across rivals, further 
giving rise to difficulties of interpretation and response, enhancing the competitive potential 
of tactical actions, and thereby importantly conditioning the classic AMC model to enhance 
the interpretability of tactical actions. In short, our findings suggest that the field can benefit 
from a more encompassing and nuanced portrayal of competitive interaction.
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Notes
1. Coaches’ statements sometimes involved multiple rationales. The statistics above are based on the cod-
ers’ first mentioned rationale for the statement. The index was much higher (0.86) when we counted any match 
between the coders’ rationales for each statement.
2. Eight rationales could be classified in another cell. For example, rationales such as “to surprise” or “to 
mislead” were mainly focused on tricking rivals for gaining short-term benefits. There were instances, however, in 
which the intended benefits had prolonged effects in the next quarters of the basketball game. Similarly, rationales 
in Cells III, VI, and IX primarily deal with external parties beyond current competitor, but they could also involve 
longer term strategic outcomes (e.g., to preserve rival dignity or to mislead future rivals).
3. A team includes coaches and players.
4. The identifiers AR (action rationale) and FR (forbearance rationale) correspond to the ID shown in Table 
3, whereas the identifier CG (Coach #, Game #) in the text corresponds to the unique ID of a coach statement in our 
dataset not included in Table 3.
5. For example, coaches made a player substitution with a primary purpose to preserve rival dignity (AR 
40; FR40), sanction a player (FR39), motivate a team (AR35; AR35), increase player confidence (AR36; FR36), 
create rival weakness or neutralize advantage (AR34; AR29), manage resource constraints (AR13; FR14; FR15), 
preserve and optimize resources (AR10; AR11), improve strategy execution (AR8), boost energy (AR6), or provide 
learning opportunities (AR3; FR3, AR4; FR4).
6. Whereas Coach 7 expressed 32.5 rationales per game, ranging from 23 to 42, Coach 4 averaged a similar 
number of rationales per game, 30.75, but with a much narrower range of 28 to 32 (see Table 5).
7. Although our study was not designed to confirm such findings statistically, out of curiosity we ran 
a mixed-effect logit model to tentatively assess whether these findings hold taking into account all observa-
tions and controlling for coach and team attributes (coach fixed effect, game effect, period of the game, time 
to interview, past game score, available players in the game, winning confidence, head coach experience). 
The results showed that coaches with more titles had 42% higher odds of forbearance (odds ratio = 1.42, 
p < 0.02), whereas head coach experience was unrelated to forbearance likelihood (these results are available 
on request).
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